Why do populist governments pass unpopular policies?

Populists don't stay in power by being popular—they stay in power by keeping people mad.

Creative Commons License, on Flickr by Rylie Howlerter

Donald Trump rose to political power in the US on a wave of populism a decade ago, and his status as a consequential political figure has only grown since then. His most recent undertaking has been to usher through Congress a sweeping legislative Act that is wildly unpopular, carries an unprecedented price tag, and benefits the wealthy while hurting the poor. How can a populist, who came to power on a surge of frustration, enact public policy that reinforces, rather than remedies, the source of people’s angst?

Populism is antidemocratic

Populism is a weird thing. It doesn’t describe something ideological. Populism can come from conservative or liberal political movements. What populist movements have in common is bonding people together through a sense of feeling put upon by those more powerful than them. Populist movements reinforce a sense of ire, angst, and injustice aimed at “elites,” which can be defined different ways.

“Elites” might refer to corporate or business leaders who are seen as wielding disproportionate power. It might refer to government officials or elected people in positions of power who are accused of using it irresponsibly. Or elites might refer to journalists or media leaders who play outsized roles in shaping an information environment. Elites can also refer to researchers, scientists, the highly educated, or university affiliates. A small populist movement might target just one of these populations, whereas a large populist movement could target all of them.

The key to populism is an “us versus them” mentality. Such a mentality easily falls from a society riven by exacerbating income inequality and partisan polarization for more than 40 years. A population that is already divided into strong partisan camps is easily coaxed into a populist movement that helps people direct their anger at specific targets.

When populism comes from ideological conservatism, it is typically focused on stoking nationalism—that’s the “us”—and targeting immigrants as the source of societal ills—that’s the “them.” Conservative populism is not compatible with democratic values of equality, liberty, and rule of law because targeting a segment of society and labeling them as outsiders is inherently antisocial.

When populism comes from ideological liberalism, it is typically focused on stoking identity as repressed people—that’s the “us”—and targeting financial elites as the source of societal ills—that’s the “them.” Liberal populism also has the potential to be deeply antidemocratic if it thwarts the rule of law and individual liberties as it seeks to enact policies to punish and disempower financial elites.

It is not in the populist regime’s interest to enact policies that would reduce inequalities.

One of the reason populist movements resonate with people is because of the way upward and downward comparisons tend to make us feel. Research in political science and social psychology by Meghan Condon and Amber Wichowsky shows that when we compare ourselves to someone we perceive as higher than us, we feel anxious, small, or envious. But when we compare ourselves to someone we perceive as lower status than us, we feel powerful, triumphant, or superior.

Think of an Olympic podium. The bronze medal winner is often happier and more grateful than the silver medalist. That’s because the silver medalist may be making an upward comparison to the first-place finisher while the bronze medalist is comparing themselves to the athletes who didn’t make the podium. Upward comparisons feel bad; downward comparisons feel good.

A conservative populist may tend toward downward comparisons, whereas a liberal populist may tend toward upward comparisons. In conservative populism, the “them” to whom the movement is opposed are portrayed as less than and undeserving, relative to the in-group. It’s a downward comparison intended to stoke positive in-group identity for those in the movement while giving the angst an easy target. Conservative populists are like the bronze medal winners.

In liberal populism, the “them” group tends to be financial elites. This upward comparison feels bad, like the silver medalist. This distinction between liberal and conservative populism may explain why there are more conservative than liberal populist movements in the world today, because conservative populism stokes more positive emotion in its us-versus-them comparisons relative to liberal populism.

Regardless of the ideological bent, a populist stokes in-group identity among a people who are taught they are unfairly kept down by outsiders who steal your just desserts. They validate (or generate) your feelings of frustration and give you targets to blame.

MAGA populism retains power by targeting outsiders

Trumpism, or MAGA, is a conservative populist movement that has overtaken the Republican Party. Trump himself is a demagogue of the movement, which means that he generates support through stoking prejudice rather than using reason or logic. Demagogues who gain power through conservative populist movements have the potential to enact policies that benefit the elites in their political movement, but may not necessarily help the base. That’s because helping those who feel downtrodden is not key to maintaining power as a populist.

Once you’ve established yourself as a populist leader, the key to holding on to that power is to double-down on the us-versus-them rhetoric that built the movement in the first place. As long as people have a target for their angst, they will continue to support the populist leader.

This explains why we see Donald Trump putting so many resources into draconian immigration policies that are serving to dehumanize and demonize large segments of the population. Not only is his administration building shoddy detention centers designed to maximize discomfort of people sent there, they are marketing these concentration camps to the movement with gleeful schadenfreude. As a conservative populist demagogue, the key to his hold on power is to continually identify the outsiders, “them,” that are the source of his people’s angst.

Populism has no mandate to fix social ills

You might think that a populist leader who comes to power because people are upset or frustrated about their circumstances would be politically compelled to affect those people’s circumstances. But it’s exactly the opposite. A populist’s hold on power depends on a large population maintaining a sense of frustration and directing their angst at another population.

By all accounts, the Big Beautiful Bill does not affect income inequality, income mobility, or equal opportunities for frustrated Americans. Housing costs remain unreasonably high in many parts of the country. Healthcare remains out-of-reach or perversely expensive for many. Caring for dependents, like young children, the disabled, and elderly is so costly for many families that they are forced to make impossible choices to balance care and occupational pursuits. Young people today are the first generation in nearly 100 years to be less likely to be financially better off than their parents. Far from addressing these inequalities, the Big Beautiful Bill, with its cuts to healthcare, reliance on deficit financing, and huge tax cuts for the wealthiest Americans, exacerbates inequalities in America.

From Reeves, Richard V., and Katherine Guyot. 2018. “Fewer Americans Are Making More than Their Parents Did—Especially If They Grew up in the Middle Class.” Brookings (blog). July 5, 2018. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/fewer-americans-are-making-more-than-their-parents-did-especially-if-they-grew-up-in-the-middle-class/.

But for a populist regime, this makes sense. It is not in the regime’s interest to enact policies that would reduce inequalities. The inequalities help feed the populism that keeps the regime in power. Researchers like Nathan Kelly refer to it as an inequality trap for good reason.

Another reason populist leaders are not responsive to broad public opinion is because of all the mechanisms of public accountability we have in democratic societies, elections are the weakest tool in the box. Political scientists Christopher Achens and Larry Bartels show that voters have short memories, are easily influenced by emotional appeals, and more reactionary than rational. Democratic citizens are better able to hold politicians to account through social protest and a probing and robust fourth estate of journalism than through elections.

If elections are a poor tool of accountability, then populist leaders have even less reason to respond to popular pressure.

Ultimately, it doesn’t matter that the bill is unpopular, because populism doesn’t mean you’re popular and need to maintain likability; populism means you reinforce a two-tiered society, where the political allies that keep you in power remain disadvantaged so that you can stoke their anger toward a group of outsiders that you identify for them. It doesn’t have to be rational, reasonable, or logical. In fact, a successful populist movement is intentionally not rational, reasonable, or logical.

So long as populism is the dominant component of one America’s major political parties, we should expect public policy to reinforce the conditions of populism, not to fix circumstances that generate it in the first place.